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CONSTITUTING COMMUNITIES THROUGH 
WORDS THAT BIND: REFLECTIONS ON 
LOYALTY OATHS 
Sanford Levinson* 
I. PREFACE: A PERSONAL INTRODUCTION 
On December 5, 1942, Felix Frankfurter articulated what can only 
be described as a personal testament of faith as he joined his colleagues 
on the Supreme Court in considering a fascinating case involving the 
meaning of the oath one takes upon becoming a naturalized citizen. 1 
After reminding the other Justices seated around the conference table 
that "[i]t is well known that a convert is more zealous than one born 
to the faith," Frankfurter went on to describe his own experience, 
unique among the Justices, of naturalization. "I was at college when 
my father became naturalized and I can assure you that for months 
preceding it was a matter of moment in our family life, and when the 
great day came it partook for me of great solemnity." Describing him-
self "[a]s one who has no ties with any formal religion,"2 he immedi-
* Professor of Law, University of Texas Law School. A.B. 1962, Duke University; Ph.D. 
1969, Harvard University; J.D. 1973, Stanford University. - Ed. 
These remarks were initially prepared for delivery at the Conference on Community Mem-
bership, Shalom Hartman Institute, Jerusalem, December 1985. The Institute is a remarkable 
place, its members incarnating an almost unique blend of passionate intellectual intensity and 
compassionate human decency. One of the participants in the Conference was the late Robert 
Cover, who was imbued by precisely the spirit that so impresses me about the Institute, and I 
dedicate this essay to his memory. 
I have benefited from the remarks of members of the Conference and from a later reading of 
the paper by David Hartman, the Director of the Institute. As always, I have also been helped 
by the willingness of my colleagues at the University of Texas to read multiple drafts and respond 
to various formulations of tentative ideas. In particular, I wish to thank John Dzienkowski, Jim 
Fishkin, Betty Sue Flowers, Scot Powe, William Powers, and Mark Yudof, with special mention 
due, as is often the case, to Douglas Laycock. I am also grateful to Don Herzog, Robert Post, 
Michael Sandel, and Tom Shaffer for their responses. 
1. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943). The case involved a Communist 
whose naturalization was challenged on the basis that no active adherent of Marxism-Leninism 
could have been "a person attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States" as 
required by the naturalization statutes. See note 49 infra and accompanying text. The majority, 
in an opinion written by Justice Murphy, ruled against the United States. Frankfurter joined 
Chief Justice Stone's dissent, which argued that Schneiderman could be deprived of his citizen· 
ship. It may, of course, be relevant that the United States was allied with the Soviet Union at the 
time of the case. 
2. Frankfurter had long since ceased affirming traditional Jewish beliefs. In 1917 he told a 
friend about attending Rosh Hashanah services and mentioned that "I'm rather happy that I can 
go through these symbolic religious events without a sense of discord or disrespect (by my mere 
presence) to the believers, tho the significance for me is not creedal." Felix Frankfurter to Kath· 
erine Ludington (Sept. 16, 1917), quoted in M. PARRISH, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND HIS TIMES: 
1440 
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ately went on to add that "perhaps the feelings that underlie religious 
forms for me run into intensification of my feelings about American 
citizenship." The Justice then referred to his having known "literally 
hundreds of men and women of the finest spirit who had to shed old 
loyalties and take on the loyalty of American citizenship." He went 
on to read his colleagues a letter he had received from Professor 
Salvemini of Harvard: 
When I took my oath [of citizenship] I felt that really I was perform-
ing a grand function. I was throwing away not my intellectual and 
moral but my juristic past. I threw it away without any regret. [Activi-
ties of the Mussolini regime] had really broken my connection with sov-
ereigns, potentates, and all those ugly things which are enumerated in 
the formula of the oath. It is a wonderful formula. Your pledges are 
only juridical and political. You are asked to sever your connections 
with the government ofyour former country, not with the people and 
civilization of your former country. And you are asked to give alle-
giance to the Constitution of your adopted country, that is, to an ideal 
life. 
Thus, I took my oath with a joyous heart, and I am sure I will keep it 
with the whole of my heart as long as I am alive. 
Justice Frankfurter then concluded his homily by stating that "Ameri-
can citizenship implies entering upon a fellowship which binds people 
together by devotion to certain feelings and ideas and ideals summa-
rized as a requirement that they be attached to the principles of the 
Constitution."3 
I suspect that at least some readers of this essay, especially those 
(like myself) who are fearful of the "new patriotism" that suffuses 
much modern political rhetoric, are uncomfortable with the intense 
patriotism expressed by the immigrants Salvemini and Frankfurter.4 
But can one imagine a political community without love of country 
and commitment to what one would hope to be its highest ideals? 
The title above describes what follows as "reflections." There is a 
topic, to be sure - loyalty oaths; however, my very interest in them -
and the style of this essay - is derived in part from my decidedly 
THE REFORM YEARS 129 (1982). And, responding to Walter Lippman's question, "What is a 
'Jew' anyway?" Frankfurter could answer only that "[a] Jew is a person whom non-Jews regard 
as a Jew." Felix Frankfurter to Jerome Frank (May 3, 1946), quoted in id. Parrish goes on to 
write that for Frankfurter "the bonds of religion had become attenuated, leaving only the nega-
tive identification supplied by some gentiles." Id. 
3. FROM THE DIARIES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 211-12 (J. Lash ed. 1975) (statement at 
conference, Dec. 5, 1942). 
4. Patriotism was a cardinal value for Frankfurter. Being told by Archibald MacLeish that 
he was writing a patriotic play, Frankfurter replied, "Good. You couldn't make it too patriotic 
for me." Kanin, Trips to Felix, in FELIX FRANKFURTER: A TRIBUTE 49 (W. Mendelson ed. 
1964), quoted in Levinson, The Democratic Faith of Felix Frankfurter, 25 STAN. L. REV. 430, 
447 n.95 (1973). 
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mixed feelings about such oaths and a consequent difficulty in resolv-
ing my views about them. The difficulty is generated by the back-
ground issue against which the loyalty oath is only one foregrounded 
highlight, i.e., personal and communal loyalty itself, the sense of fel-
lowship so strongly evoked by Frankfurter. 
Preparation of this essay has not served to resolve my own ambiva-
lences about what, after all, Duncan Kennedy once named the "funda-
mental contradiction" of all social life, the tension between "individual 
freedom" and the coercive communal life with "[o]thers (family, 
friends, bureaucrats, cultural figures, the state)" that is "necessary if 
we are to become persons at all - they provide us the stuff of our 
selves and protect us ,in crucial ways against destruction."5 It should 
not be surprising if something so fundamental does not prove amena-
ble to resolution. In any case, the reader should not expect to find a 
linear argument that moves toward a purportedly ineluctable conclu-
sion, so much as an attempt to explore what underlies (and justifies) 
the mixture of responses. At best, I might hope these remarks achieve 
the status of meditations that aid the reader in analyzing what I am 
suggesting will (or ought to) be his or her own complex views. 6 
My remarks are best understood in the light of the context in 
which they were originally presented, a Conference on Community 
Membership held at the Shalom Hartman Institute in Jerusalem, 
Israel, in December 1985. A number of scholars, drawn from political 
theory, American law, and Jewish law, convened to discuss notions of 
community membership revealed in these various bodies of thought. 
As one of the principal organizers of the conference, I was motivated 
not only by the inherent interest of these topics, but also in substantial 
part by my own perplexities, over the years, about the twin notions of 
being Jewish and being American. 
Although I feel a very strong sense of commitment to (and mem-
bership in) both communities, I have never been certain exactly what 
those commitments entail (and therefore what actually constitutes the 
meaning of my membership in them). In particular, I have wondered 
if the commitments can be reduced to words, containing propositional 
utterances, to which I would be willing to subscribe. If they cannot, 
then what is the nature of the commitments? Must we pass beyond 
5. Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 205, 211-12 
(1979). Kennedy "renounce[s]" and "recant[s]" the fundamental contradiction in Gabel & Ken-
nedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1, 15 (1984). See also the discussion of"Autonomy 
and Community" in Yudof, Library Book Selection and the Public Schools: The Quest for the 
Archimedean Point, 59 IND. L.J. 527, 530-33 (1984). 
6. A colleague has suggested, only half in jest, that I describe this essay as "an impressionist 
painting," with "splashes of thought" whose boundaries are not clearly delineated. 
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words, perhaps into the mysticism of the conclusion of Wittgenstein's 
Tractatus, "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent"?7 
I am one of that peculiar breed especially prevalent in the modem 
West- the "secular Jew."8 The one thing I am relatively clear about 
is that I am not able to subscribe to a set of affirmative theological 
propositions, including basic belief in the existence of God (let alone a 
God who revealed the Torah to Moses on Mount Sinai and entered 
into a covenantal understanding with the Jewish people). It may be, of 
course, that no such subscription is necessary; if so, that only high-
lights the question that remains: What does it mean to be a Jew (or to 
be recognized as a Jew by others)? And does that question have differ-
ent answers for one born into (or in more existentialist language, 
"thrown into") a preexistent Jewish community, as opposed to one 
who self-consciously chooses Jewish identity, as, for example, by con-
version? (Can one even imagine a convert to "secular Judaism"?) 
Similar questions can be asked about one's (my) status as a mem-
ber of the American polity. The United States, like all political enti-
ties, can be said to have a "civil religion" that its members are 
expected to profess.9 As Frances Wright, described as "an American-
ized Englishwoman of the 1820s,"10 wrote, in words that could easily 
have been endorsed a century later by Frankfurter: 
For what is it to be an American? Is it to have drawn the first breath in 
Maine, in Pennsylvania, in Florida, or in Missouri? Pshaw! ... Hence 
with such paltry, pettifogging ... calculations of nativities! They are 
American who, having complied with the constitutional regulations of 
the United States ... wed the principles of America's Declaration to 
their hearts and render the duties of American citizens practically in 
their lives. 11 
There is no guarantee, of course, that such "weddings" of principle 
to heart will endure through time. Early passion may tum into hollow 
form. I have elsewhere quoted Hegel's relevant comment: "How 
blind they are who may hope that institutions, constitutions, laws ... 
from which the spirit has flown, can subsist any longer; or that forms 
in which intellect and feeling now take no interest are powerful 
7. L. WrrrGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS Lomco-PHILOSOPHICUS 7 (1921). 
8. There is, I believe, no analogous identification of oneself as a "secular Protestant" or "sec-
ular Catholic,'' though one does sometimes hear references to "lapsed Catholics" or "apostates." 
9. See Levinson, "The Constitution" in American Civil Religion, 1979 SUP. Cr. REV. 123. 
10. W. SOLLORS, BEYOND ETHNICITY: CONSENT AND DESCENT IN AMERICAN CuLTURE 
152 (1986). 
11. Address by Frances Wright in Cincinnati, Ohio, printed in The Beacon, Mar. 17, 1838, 
quoted in W. SOLLORS, supra note 10, at 153. 
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enough to be any longer the bond of a nation!"12 To try to discover 
what bonds us (or could bond us) into a coherent community, espe-
cially after the triumph of a distinctly modernist - and historicist -
sense of the contingencies of our own culture, is at the core of my 
work. I am much more certain about my inchoate feelings of member-
ship in the American community than I am about my ability to con-
fess to any peculiarly "American" set of faith propositions, including 
the ascertainability or coherence of alleged constitutional norms. 
Again, my scholarly interest in these questions flows directly from in-
tensely personal self-reflection.13 
Much of the contemporary interest in community, as in the work, 
for example, of Michael Sandel, 14 focuses on notions of "encumbered" 
selves whose task it is, at least in part, to come to recognize - to 
discover - the communities within which they are already embedded. 
One does not choose to be a member, for example, of one's family; one 
is a member, with whatever implications follow from that fact. Profes-
sor Werner Sollors has recently emphasized that "descent" plays a 
crucial role in providing one's identity. "Descent relations are those 
defined by anthropologists as relations of 'substance' (by blood or na-
ture)."15 In tum, the language of descent "emphasizes our positions 
as heirs, our hereditary qualities, liabilities, and entitlements."16 One 
implication of a focus on descent, on the preestablished nature of one's 
identity, is that institutions that operate by descent principles, such as 
families, do not ask for overt loyalty oaths or vows of membership; 
that is presupposed.11 
12. HEGEL'S PoLmCAL WRITINGS 244 (T. Knox trans. 1964), quoted in Levinson, Judicial 
Review and the Problem of the Comprehensible Constitution, 59 TEXAS L. REV. 395, 418 (1981). 
13. No doubt there is a similar linkage between the personal and the scholarly in my interest 
in wedding vows and the institution of marriage. 
14. See M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982). 
15. W. SOLLORS, supra note 10, at 6. 
16. Id. 
17. See, for example, the famous comment by Horace Kallen, a major early twentieth cen· 
tury theorist (and defender) of cultural pluralism: "Men may change their clothes, their politics, 
their wives, their religions, their philosophies, to a greater or lesser extent: they cannot change 
their grandfathers." H. KALLEN, Democracy versus the Melting Pot, in CULTURE AND DEMOC-
RACY IN THE UNITED STATES: STUDIES IN THE GROUP PSYCHOLOGY OF THE AMERICAN PEO· 
PLES 122 (1924) (essay originally published in 1915), quoted in W. SOLLORS, supra note 10, at 
151. Kallen later elaborated some of the implications of this distinction between what Sollors 
terms "blood" (grandfathers) and "law" (wives): 
The citizen of America may become one of England, the Baptist a Methodist, the lawyer a 
banker, the Elk a Mason, the Republican a Socialist, the capitalist a proletarian. But the 
son, father, uncle, cousin cannot cease to be these; he cannot reject the relationships these 
words express, nor alter them ..•. Natural groups, like the Irish, the Jews, or any national-
ity, cannot be destroyed without destroying their members. Artificial groups, like states, 
churches, professions, castes, can. These are social organizations; natural groups are social 
organisms •... 
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But the recognition of "encumbrances" of the self, however impor-
tant, should not gainsay the extent to which our most fundamental 
self-conceptions, and political theories, do indeed involve notions of 
"chosen identities" and "intentional communities." Professor Sollors, 
who views the tension "between consent and descent . .. as the central 
drama in American culture,"18 describes "consent relations" as in-
cluding "those of 'law' or 'marriage,' " and he goes on to note that 
"consent language stresses our abilities as mature free agents and 'ar-
chitects of our fates' to choose our spouses, our destinies, and our 
political systems."19 Choice in this case allows not only collaboration 
in common enterprises, but also the dissolution of bonds, whether by 
divorce, moving from one religion to another (or to no religion at all), 
or emigrating from one country to the voluntary embrace of another.20 
And Sollors well demonstrates the linkage in American writing be-
tween conceptualizations of "private" realms of love and marriage, on 
the one hand, and the public realm of citizenship on the other: The 
"arranged marriage,'' by which a spouse (almost invariably from one's 
own "ethnic group") is chosen by one's parents is systematically re-
jected in favor of the consensual marriage (often to an ethnic "out-
sider") sparked by romantic attachment. "American allegiance, the 
very concept of citizenship developed in the revolutionary period, was 
- like love - based on consent, not on descent, which further 
\) 
blended the rhetoric of America with the language of love and the 
concept of romantic love with American identity."21 
The United States, as a nation of immigrants, has posed through-
out its entire history the problem of chosen identity. A "double choos-
H. KALLEN, THE STRUCTURE OF LASTING PEACE 31 (1918), quoted in w. SOLLORS, supra note 
10, at 151. 
One sees these views reflected in the following description by an author of her ambivalences 
when observing the intense bond between her husband and their infant daughter: "I am some-
times sad at being displaced. Their tie is blood, and mine with Leon is based only on volition. 
Ours can be broken; theirs cannot." Kates, Hers, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1986, at C2, col. 3. 
One may, of course, doubt whether family relationships are quite so binding (or quite so 
"natural": consider adoption, for example) as Kallen portrays them, but surely anyone with 
such a view would find it unnecessary, perhaps even bizarre, to suggest applying the same kinds 
of procedures to the family as to "artificial" entities like the state. A true "nation-state,'' involv-
ing a perfect overlap between the social and the political, would present an interesting test case of 
Kallen's categories, but there are few such states, and the United States is most definitely not one 
of them. 
18. W. SOLLORS, supra note 10, at 6 (emphasis in original). 
19. Id. See the remarks of Horace Kallen quoted in note 17 supra. 
20. One should note, of course, that not all political systems allow voluntary emigration, and 
most are less willing than the United States to embrace immigrants. No country, including the 
United States, leaves the decision to enter solely to the discretion of the would-be immigrant. 
21. W. SOLLORS, supra note 10, at 112; see also id. at 151 ("To say it plainly, American 
identity is often imagined as volitional consent, as love and marriage, ethnicity as seemingly 
immutable ancestry and descent."). 
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ing" is involved: the choice of an immigrant to adopt an "American" 
identity is coupled with the necessity facing that immigrant to be cho-
sen by the United States itself as suitable to be a member of the polit-
ical community. Michael Walzer has written in Spheres of Justice 
both that "the primary good that we distribute to one another is mem-
bership in some human community,"22 and that the "distinctiveness of 
cultures and groups," a value that most of us support, "depends on 
closure."23 This means, among other things, that a "sovereign state" 
must be permitted to "take shape and claim the authority to make its 
own admissions policy, to control and sometimes restrain the flow of 
immigrants."24 And Peter Schuck and Rogers Smith have recently 
argued that "republican" thinkers, much admired in some circles 
these days,25 endorse the right of a political community to "refuse con-
sent to the membership of those who would disrupt their necessary 
homogeneity."26 A "community" truly open to all comers is almost a 
contradiction in terms, although it is clearly possible to endorse such 
an open-arms policy in behalf of values other than community.27 
One important device used by intentional communities to define 
their membership is the taking of oaths focusing on the central values 
- or propositions - of the common enterprise. Although the discus-
sion that follows touches as well on more general problems of loyalty, 
it is the loyalty oath and its special problems (and perhaps attractions) 
upon which I will focus. Loyalty oaths are inherently controversial; I 
suspect that many of the readers of this essay are antagonistic to them. 
22. M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 31 (1983). 
23. Id. at 39. 
24. Id. 
25. See, e.g., Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 30·31 
(1986) ("[T]he purpose of this article is to help revive aspects of an attractive conception of 
governance - we may call it republican .... "). For suggestions that this conception is less 
attractive than might first appear, see Hirsch, The Threnody of Liberalism: Constitutional Liberty 
and the Renewal of Community, 14 POL. THEORY 423 (1986); Herzog, Some Questions for 
Republicans, 14 POL. THEORY 473 (1986). These articles are part of a symposium on "Civil 
Republicanism and its Critics." 
26. See P. SCHUCK & R. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN 
THE AMERICAN POLITY 28 (1985). Harry Hirsch notes that "only a modem society that ruth· 
lessly engages in the practice of exclusion can be homogeneous." Hirsch, supra note 25, at 435 
(emphasis added). 
27. Some writers, though, have expressed dissent from the notions expressed in this para-
graph. Thus Joseph Carens argues, in an as yet unpublished paper, that liberal states committed 
to the priority of individual rights cannot limit immigration in order to protect homogeneity (or, 
for that matter, economic status). J. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Limits of Liberal Theory 
(unpublished manuscript); see also B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 89-
95 (1980); Lichtenberg, National Boundaries and Moral Boundaries: A Cosmopolilan View, in 
BOUNDARIES: NATIONAL AUTONOMY AND ITS LIMITS 79-100 (P. Brown & H. Shue eds. 1981); 
Nett, The Civil Right We Are Nol Ready For: The Right of Free Movement of People 011 the Face 
of the Earth, 81 ETHICS 212 (1971). 
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In order to understand better the nature of the controversy (and an-
tagonism), the essay begins by examining certain kinds of public pro-
nouncements, what I call "words that bind." Of course many 
pronouncements can be characterized as "words that bind," including 
the signification of assent to the terms of any given contract, which 
itself can be viewed as simply a particular instance of binding by 
promise. 28 I want, however, to examine some of the implications of 
several peculiarly public oaths or vows that play a central role in defin-
ing or even constituting communities, whether political or otherwise. 
Indeed, the community becomes constituted only because the persons 
taking the oaths see their own self-identity to be derived from the com-
munity to which the oath is directed.29 One may or may not regard -
the oath-takers as "individuals," but it is clear that the person sub-
scribing to the oath would reject an identity as "merely" individual 
inasmuch as maintaining that atomized conception of identity would 
contradict what is most genuinely significant about the oath. 
II. DEFINING COMMUNITIES THROUGH OATHS 
Oaths are mixtures of pure form and substantive content. Their 
formal nature may remind one of the "contentless" seals once thought 
necessary to give legal validity to contracts. 30 In the case of vows, 
they signify a desire to be considered a member of a particular com-
munity and a willingness to remain within its boundaries. As Profes-
sor Robert Post has recently written, in an essay building on the 
tradition of social analysis going back at least as far as Emile Durk-
heim, "A community without boundaries is without shape or identity; 
if pursued with single-minded determination, tolerance is incompatible 
with the very possibility of a community."31 Preservation of "commu-
28. See c. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981). 
29. Donald Herzog has correctly pointed out that not all oaths manifest "constitutive" no-
tions of self-identity. Thus the oaths attendant to an adult's joining, say, the Elks Club (I assume 
that the club in fact has rituals) are extraordinarily unlikely to signal any change in the core 
identity of the oath-taker. However, as one ofHerzog's own examples, involving the Freemasons, 
suggests, understanding historical and social context is important to making such judgments 
about importance. Thus, joining the Freemasons in the late eighteenth century might well have 
signaled a fundamental fact about one's conception of oneself. Today, however, we (who are not 
Masons) do not tend to differentiate "Masons" from Elk, Moose, and other adult social clubs. 
Letter from Donald Herzog to Sanford Levinson (June 5, 1986). 
30. See Arthur Leif's proposed definition of "seal" as a "way of saying 'this counts,' 'this is 
for keeps,' 'we're not kidding around any more' and similar things. Seals are not the only mecha-
nism of that kind; the archaic language and ceremony of a marriage ... has something of the 
same intent." A Letter from Professor Leff to a Prospective Publisher, 94 YALE L.J. 1852 (1985). 
31. Post, Reputation and the Constitution: The Social Foundations of Defamation Law, 74 
CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming); see E. DURKHEIM, DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 108-09 (G. 
Simpson trans. 1933); K. ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF 
DEVIANCE 13 (1966). 
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nity" necessarily means that "tolerance must at some point or another 
come to an end. Exactly where that point is depends a great deal on 
the importance one attaches to the viability of community and to the 
exercise of freedom of expression as a reflection of individual auton-
omy."32 In any case, the limits of tolerance may be marked by oaths 
that both measure assent to the community's central propositions and 
put the oath-takers on notice of the boundaries beyond which they go 
only at peril of communal reproach. 
I am particularly interested in three kinds of communities, marked 
by three kinds of oaths: (1) the polity, which can call on its members 
to take an oath of loyalty swearing their commitment to certain beliefs 
- usually involving the legitimacy of the state, its particular political 
structure, or its ideological aspirations; (2) the marriage, marked by 
wedding vows, by which (in our culture at least) two individuals join 
together in constituting a special kind of common enterprise; (3) the 
religious denomination, whose adherents often engage in creedal affir-
mations or similar public confession of their belief in its essential 
propositions. 
Perhaps the most interesting and important aspect of all of these 
oaths is their role as signifiers of a transformed consciousness. The 
transformation signified is often a purportedly "new" (or, at least, sub-
stantially changed) identity on the part of those taking the vow. This 
signifying role is clearest in the wedding vow, but a transformation 
certainly can be present elsewhere as well, especially in political natu-
ralization and religious conversion. For instance, the symbolism of 
religious conversion often includes "birth" or "rebirth"; after all, we 
have been told that only a person willing to lose his or her life "will 
save it, and live."33 Also, it is surely no coincidence that one of the 
major events of the recently enacted national liturgy involving the res-
toration of the Statue of Liberty was a nationally televised oath-taking, 
which transformed recent immigrants into fellow citizens.34 
32. Post, supra note 31; see also Yudof, supra note 5 (education has function both of promot-
ing autonomy and preserving community by transmitting communal values). 
33. Luke 17:33 (New English Bible) ("Whoever seeks to save his life will lose it; and whoever 
loses it will save it, and live."); see also Matthew 10:39; Mark 8:35. Professor Sollors notes the 
frequency with which such "conversion" imagery appears in autobiographical narratives of im-
migrants detailing their becoming "Americans." He offers as an example the beginning of Mary 
r Antin's The Promised Land: "I was born, I have lived, and I have been made over. Is it not time 
to write my life's story? I am just as much out of the way as if I were dead, for I am absolutely 
other than the person whose story I have to tell." W. SOLLORS, supra note 10, at 32 (quoting M. 
ANTIN, THE PROMISED LAND xi (1921)). 
34. In the context of commercial transactions, any transformations manifested by an ordi-
nary contract are usually of small import to the individual's self-conception. In any event, I am 
not claiming to be introducing hard-and-fast analytic distinctions so much as pointing to our 
common recognition that there remains an important difference between agreeing to be bound to 
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III. POLITICAL LOYALTY OATHS 
Loyalty oaths have been part of American history from its (Eng-
lish) origins in the seventeenth century. The Puritan settlers of New 
England had agreed even before leaving old England to prohibit settle-
ment of those "not conformable to their government," and by 1634 
local governments measured cm:lformity in part by a citizen's willing-
ness to take an oath of loyalty pledging, "by the great and dreadful 
Name of the Everliving God," to be "true and faithfull" to the govern-
ment of the commonwealth. This entailed, among other things, a com-
mitment to "yield assistance and support thereunto," not to mention 
"submitting myself to the wholesome Laws and Orders made and es-
tablished by the same." Perhaps most interesting (or ominous) is the 
promise that "I will not plot or practice any evil against it, or consent 
to any that shall do so; but will timely discover and reveal the same to 
lawfull authority now here established, for the speedy preventing 
thereof."35 And the very first item printed, in 1639, by the first print-
ing press in the English-speaking colonies was this loyalty oath. 36 
The controversy about loyalty oaths is as old as their use. Roger 
Williams was only the most famous protestant against the Massachu-
setts Bay Colony oath; since his time, the conflict between the propo-
nents and opponents of oath-taking has never ceased. Part of the 
reason for the intensity of the debate has to do with the history of the 
United States as both a revolutionary and an ideological community. 
Many persons regarded the American Revolution as a distinctively 
ideological struggle between the friends of "liberty" or "republican 
virtue" and the corrupt forces of the English court. 37 There was noth-
ing "natural" about the social character equipped to maintain a repub-
lican political order; the community had to monitor actively the 
individuals who composed the social order and make sure that they 
did not succumb to decidedly unvirtuous temptations. 
For obvious reasons, monitoring was especially important during 
the Revolution itself, when the fate of the fledgling country depended 
on the transformation of patriotic loyalties from England to the newly 
the terms of a commercial contract and agreeing to be bound to another in, say, a marital 
relationship. 
35. Quoted in H. HYMAN, To TRY MEN'S SOULS: LOYALTY TESTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 
14-15 (1959). Hyman's is the standard history of loyalty oaths. 
36. Id. 
37. See B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967); 
G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1969). See also, however, F. Mc-
DONALD, Novus 0RDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 
(1985), for a magnificent portrayal of the mixture of views contending with one another in the 
post-Revolutionary United States. 
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declared United States of America. George Washington himself wrote 
in December 1775 "that it is high time a test act was prepared and 
every man called upon to declare himself; that we may distinguish 
friends from foes.'' 38 He also advised each of the new states to "fix 
upon some oath or affirmation of allegiance, to be tendered to all the 
inhabitants without exception, and to outlaw those that refuse it."39 
The Father of our Country thus helped to spawn its first loyalty oaths, 
as both the Continental Congress and the states followed his advice. 
And Harold Hyman, the ranking American historian of loyalty oaths, 
has pointed out that Washington was notably insistent on enforcing 
the congressionally mandated loyalty oath.40 
I do not necessarily mean this as criticism of Washington. Many 
writers have pointed out that an altogether plausible implication of 
"consent of the governed" is the manifestation of actual consent 
through a loyalty oath.41 It would have been paradoxical indeed had a 
revolution based in part on consent proved indifferent to how that cen-
tral attribute of a legitimate government would be ascertained. And, 
to put it mildly, it has not proved easy for liberal theorists to derive 
more satisfactory theories of political obligation. Many candidates, in-
cluding the Lockean chestnut of "tacit consent," are significantly less 
respectful of individual autonomy than the emphasis on overt oath-
taking. 
Loyalty oaths have recurrently returned to the forefront of Ameri-
can political consciousness whenever the United States has been (or 
has been perceived as being) at war. Thus the great clash of 1861-1865 
provoked both the Union and the Confederacy to guarantee the loy-
alty of their citizens by requiring oaths. In the modem period, the 
"Cold War" has been the principal factor generating the demand for 
proofs of loyalty, and American politics of the late 1940s through the 
early 1960s featured regular struggles about the propriety of loyalty 
oaths. Those who regard themselves as "liberal" in their political 
views have criticized loyalty oaths and have argued that a liberal state 
has no business inquiring into the political views held by its members. 
Their (i.e., our) obligation is not to affirm or otherwise hold certain 
38. H. HYMAN, supra note 35, at 74. 
39. Id. at 85. See, for a modem variant, the recommendation by Phillipine Justice Minister 
Neptali Gonzales that charges of rebellion, a capital offense under Phillipine law, be dropped in 
regard to those members of the military who would swear loyalty to the Aquino government. 
The news report indicated that "oath-taking ceremonies were held at camps throughout the 
country." Marcos Running Mate, 40 Others are Charged in Revolt, Boston Globe, July 29, 1986, 
at 4, col. 5. 
40. H. HYMAN, supra note 35, at 82-84. 
41. See P. SCHUCK & R. SMITH, supra note 26, at 27-28. 
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beliefs, but rather (and only) to behave in conformity with legal 
requirements. 
In the modem period, struggles over loyalty oaths have often taken 
legal form and led to pronouncements of the Supreme Court concern-
ing their constitutionality. One of the great testaments in behalf of 
what I defined above as the liberal notion of a behaviorally oriented 
state can be found in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Bar-
nette, 42 a case decided during World War II. A child who was a mem-
ber of the Jehovah's Witnesses was punished for refusing to enact a 
peculiarly American form of the loyalty oath - the pledge of alle-
giance to the American flag at the beginning of the public school day, 
as required by state law. The Supreme Court reversed the child's sus-
pension from the public school, with Justice Jackson writing one of the 
most-quoted sentences in all constitutional law: "If there is any fixed 
star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or 
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, 
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by 
word or act their faith therein."43 Justice Frankfurter dissented, say-
ing that the state could legitimately try to inculcate patriotism through 
a compulsory pledge of allegiance. Barnette's "fixed star" is almost 
invariably cited whenever the state tries to require its employees to 
take loyalty oaths indicating their commitment to certain beliefs, in-
cluding, for example, the impropriety of overthrowing the American 
government by force or violence. Indeed, it is difficult to see how any 
oath could survive Justice Jackson's own statement of the American 
credo. And, after a somewhat checkered pattern of case law, the 
Court has proved quite hostile to most loyalty oaths, though it has 
refused to reject them entirely.44 
A taste of the current doctrine of American constitutional law is 
provided by Cole v. Richardson, 45 in which the Boston State Hospital 
dismissed a research sociologist because she refused to take an oath 
required of all public employees in Massachusetts. The oath was as 
follows: 
I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will uphold and defend the Consti-
42. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
43. 319 U.S. at 642. 
44. See Umbach & Levinson, Die Zulassung zum iJJfentlichen Dienst und die Schranken der 
po/itischen Betiitigung der Beamten in den USA, in EXTREMISTEN UND OFFENTLICHER DIENST: 
RECHSTLAGE UND PRAXIS DES ZUGANGS ZUM UND DER ENTLASSUNG AUS DEM OFFEN-
TLICHEN DIENST IN WESTEUROPA, USA, JUGOSLAWIEN UND DER EG 559, 569-75 (E. Bock-
enforde, C. Tomuschat & D. Umbach eds. 1981) (on constitutional protection of political rights 
of U.S. civil servants). 
45. 405 U.S. 676 (1972). 
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tution of the United States of America and the Constitution of the Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts and that I will oppose the overthrow of the 
government of the United States of America or of this Commonwealth 
by force, violence or by any illegal or unconstitutional method.46 
The Court, through Chief Justice Burger, upheld the oath. Yet the 
majority went out of its way to affirm several earlier decisions, ex-
tremely controversial less than a decade before, striking down a vari-
ety of oaths. Thus the state cannot condition employment "on an oath 
that one has not engaged, or will not engage" in such speech as "criti-
cizing institutions of government; discussing political doctrine that ap-
proves the overthrow of certain forms of government; and supporting 
candidates for political office." Nor may employment be conditioned 
on oaths "denying past, or abjuring future, [constitutionally protected] 
associational activities" such as "membership in organizations having 
illegal purposes unless one knows of the purpose and shares a specific 
intent to promote the illegal purpose."47 
Cole represents what might be termed a "minimalist" position in 
regard to the demands that the state can make of its employees. Of 
course, our state and federal governments have not required a general 
loyalty oath from the citizenry as such; it is primarily those seeking 
government employment (including membership in the armed forces) 
or joining licensed occupations like the bar who are forced to swear 
even the minimal oath. Otherwise oaths are absent. Whatever the ide-
ological emphasis on consent in the An:ierican polity, our allocation of 
citizenship has a heavily descent-oriented aspect derived from the 
fourteenth amendment, which makes birth within the territory of the 
United States a sufficient condition for citizenship and whatever bene-
fits that status brings. It is not, for example, a prerequisite for voting 
that one swear even a Cole oath.48 
The United States does, however, look into propositional beliefs 
and require a loyalty oath of nonemployees in at least one important 
instance - when a person wishes to join our polity. As a predicate 
condition for becoming a naturalized citizen, applicants must show 
themselves "attached to the principles of the Constitution of the 
United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of 
the United States."49 As David Weissbrodt writes, "The purpose be-
46. 405 U.S. at 677-78. 
47. 405 U.S. at 680. 
48. It is also worth mentioning that one other common occasion for the swearing of a loyalty 
oath is in applying for a passport entitling one to leave and enter the United States. Why an oath 
should be required for a passport, but not for a ballot, is not self-evident. 
49. Immigration and Nationality Act§ 316(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1982). Requirements for 
naturalization are summarized in D. WEISSBRODT, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE IN A 
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hind this requirement is the admission to citizenship of only those per-
sons who are in general accord with the basic principles of the 
community."5° Courts have identified these principles as including 
"belief in representative democracy, a commitment to the ideals em-
bodied in the Bill of Rights, and a willingness to accept the basic social 
premise that change only be effected in an orderly manner."51 Among 
other disqualifications for citizenship is voluntary adult membership in 
the Communist Party or any other totalitarian group, as well as the 
advocacy, irrespective of membership in any particular organization, 
of the overthrow of the United States government by unconstitutional 
means.52 
One aspect of satisfying these predicate conditions is the appli-
cant's taking an oath, as set out in the United States Immigration and 
Nationality Act. The Act prescribes a fivefold oath that must be 
taken, "in open court," by the citizen-to-be: 
(1) to support the Constitution of the United States; (2) to renounce and 
abjure absolutely and entirely all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign 
prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty of whom or which the petitioner 
was before a subject or citizen; (3) to support and defend the Constitu-
tion and the laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign and 
domestic; (4) to bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and (S)(A) to 
bear arms on behalf of the United States when required by the law, or 
(B) to perform noncombatant service in the Armed Forces of the United 
States when required by the law, or (C) to perform work of national 
importance under civilian direction when required by the law.53 
Whatever one might think of this particular set of commitments, it 
is worth noting that only naturalized citizens must make them in order 
to establish their status as citizens and to receive the benefits of that 
status. Given the modem view that the State can only minimally dis-
tinguish between citizens and resident aliens (or other "persons") in 
allocating burdens or benefits, 54 the principal benefit conferred only on 
citizens is the right to vote and thus choose those who govern. 55 
As a person born in the United States, however, I received my citi-
zenship - and suffrage - "for free," as it were, without any require-
NUTSHELL 161-90 (1984), excerpted in T.A. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION: PRO-
CESS AND POLICY 8S9-68 (198S). 
so. D. WEISSBRODT, supra note 49, at 173. 
SI. Id. 
S2. See Immigration and Nationality Act§ 313, 8 U.S.C. § 1424 (1982). 
S3. Immigration and Nationality Act § 337(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a) (1982). 
S4. See the materials collected in T.A. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 49, at 834-49. 
SS. This distinction between citizens and noncitizens, it should be emphasized, is contingent 
rather than logically necessary. As Gerald Rosberg has pointed out, a number of states allowed 
resident aliens to vote throughout the nineteenth century. Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: 
Why Not the Right to Vote?, 1S MICH. L. REV. 1092, 1116-3S (1977). 
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ment of an affirmative manifestation of community membership on my 
part other than formal registration to vote. I have, of course, taken 
several loyalty oaths, one when I became a member of the California 
bar, others when I accepted employment at various universities, and 
yet another when I applied for a passport. Many other native-born 
citizens of the United States have also been forced to take such oaths, 
but what is more significant is the presence in our polity of literally 
millions of compatriots who have never had to swear fealty to the 
United States or its Constitution. 
Thus the obvious question: Why does a naturalized citizen have to 
take an oath in order to vote while I do not? One formal answer to 
this question is simply to argue that it is misleading. Naturalized citi-
zens do not take an oath "in order to vote," but rather in order to 
become a citizen, which renders one eligible to vote. And one might 
go on to point out that the fourteenth amendment assigns citizenship 
to every person "born . . . in the United States," so that an oath for 
native-barns is wholly superfluous. 
The question, though, concerns the extent to which we ought to 
collapse the status of "citizen" into that of "voter." We certainly 
know that in fact citizenship does not entail a right to vote. The most 
important historical example in this country is certainly women, 
whose citizenship did not protect them from denial of the franchise 
until the passage of the nineteenth amendment. And today we deny 
such citizens as children, convicted felons, and some of the mentally 
retarded the right to vote. So even a textual explanation of why I 
become a citizen without having to subscribe to an oath cannot explain 
why I am entitled to participate in community decisionmaking by vot-
ing even absent any overt willingness to make a public commitment to 
minimally shared values. 
One might argue, of course, that merely by being born and raised 
in the United States, I absorb the central values of American culture in 
a way that people born and raised elsewhere do not. This is an empiri-
cal rather than a theoretical proposition. One might devise techniques 
for measuring "Americanness" - and its partners "non-American-
ness" or even "un-Americanness" - and see what the actual results 
are when placed against a sample population. In any event, there is 
certainly reason to doubt whether simply breathing the free air of the 
United States is enough to ward off the distempers that may threaten 
the maintenance of our noblest political ideals. 
The United States has always been more notably pluralistic than 
any other major world community. Indeed, from its inception, it has 
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been obsessed with what makes one an "American."56 And the 
United States is becoming ever more genuinely pluralistic as immigra-
tion patterns shift from traditional emphasis on Europe to Asia and 
Latin America.57 "Americans" speak different languages and worship 
different gods. Hackneyed references to the "Judea-Christian" tradi-
tion will not prove attractive, one suspects, to those who come from 
the Far East. Even among native-born citizens, examples of pluralism 
abound. Among other things, parents can send their children to pri-
vate schools imbuing values significantly antagonistic to those of the 
public schools. Certainly one can debate the extent of a common 
political or cultural identity within the United States. 
Might one rationally require that a loyalty oath identical to that 
asked of our new citizens be asked even of native-born persons, at least 
if they wish to participate in community decisionmaking through vot-
ing? Why should persons who refuse to adhere to central community 
tenets even conceive (or be allowed by others to conceive) of them-
selves as members of the community? If readers are offended by this 
suggestion, then they should ask themselves why it is legitimate to 
impose such a requirement on naturalized citizens. Why do we not 
open membership in the American polity to all persons simply on a 
first-come, first-accepted basis, save for any further exclusionary stan-
dards that would have to be rigorously "content-neutral" in regard to 
political beliefs?58 This would allow the United States to exclude the 
sick or the indigent, but not the Communist or, for that matter, the 
Afrikaaner refugee whose greatest delight would be the establishment 
of apartheid in North America. No longer could newspaper stories be 
written about immigration officials interrogating applicants for citizen-
ship on their knowledge of, or commitment to, principles of "Ameri-
canism."59 Why do we assign the right to vote on the basis of mere 
56. See W. SOLLORS, supra note 10, at 40-65. 
57. See Reinhold, Flow of 3d World Immigrants Alters Weave of U.S. Society, N.Y. Times, 
June 30, 1986, at Al, col. 5, which notes that only five percent of the 570,000 legally admitted 
immigrants arriving in the United States in 1985 came from Europe; nearly half came from Asia, 
and migration from Latin America constituted another 40%. Moreover, in absolute numbers, 
more immigrants will arrive legally during the 1980s, approximately six million, than during any 
other decade in our history save for 1901-1910, when 8.8 million immigrants arrived. If illegal 
immigration, estimated at 300,000 to 500,000 per year, is added, then the numbers could surpass 
even that earlier highpoint. (Immigrants, however, constituted a significantly higher percentage 
of the population during these earlier periods. Indeed, today the United States' percentage of 
foreign-born residents (7%) is substantially less than Australia's (20%), Canada's (16%), or 
France's (11%).) 
58. For the emphasis on "content-neutrality" as a major foundation of contemporary first 
amendment doctrine, see, for example, Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 
466 U.S. 789 (1984); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
59. See Lowenstein, Immigration Aides Base Big Decisions on 15-Minute Chats, Wall St. J., 
June 5, 1986, at 1, col. 4. 
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descent? In order to test our response to such a suggestion, I want to 
discuss, and examine our response to, what may appear to be a sharply 
different example of words that bind - the wedding vow. 
IV. THE INTENTIONAL COMMUNITY OF MARRIAGE 
Even among intellectual circles thoroughly imbued with the skep-
tical ethos of late twentieth-century modernism, one finds people get-
ting married. Indeed, a particularly interesting phenomenon is the 
decision to "get married" that is made by irreligious couples who have 
lived together for some years. This may mean only that they make an 
appearance in front of a justice of the peace; often, though, oaths are 
ceremonially taken in front of friends and family. What do such 
couples believe they are doing? One answer, whose obviousness 
should not mask its significance, is that they are announcing a trans-
formation of status, from that of "singleness" (or atomism) into that of 
marriage. 
At least within the major traditions of the West, the public taking 
of vows has long been a part of entering into marriage. 60 During the 
medieval and early-modem periods, the "betrothal" was more signifi-
cant than the actual "wedding," and an agreement was the key to a 
successful betrothal. 61 Although the church through this period was 
(successfully) attempting to play an increasingly significant role in the 
ceremonies of marriage, "the church's own courts recognized that, in 
the absence of church rites, the various forms of betrothal - spousals, 
handfasts, trothplights, contracts, represented a valid marriage." The 
required proof for a valid marriage was "that vows had been made 
voluntarily, in the present tense, or when in the future tense were fol-
lowed by intercourse. "62 
According to Gillis, "The seriousness of a commitment was mea-
sured by the degree of publicity that attended it. Promises made in 
private were regarded as having little worth as compared with those 
60. See J. GILLIS, FOR BETIER, FOR WORSE: BRITISH MARRIAGES 1600 TO THE PRESENT 
16 (1985). Gillis points out that more informal traditions exist, both in other societies and within 
our own. For Trobrianders the sharing of food apparently performed the same function as the 
articulation of words, and our own history has included "common law marriage" where there is 
no formal exchange of vows. See also L. MAIR, MARRIAGE 88-103 (1971) (chapter on "Marriage 
Procedures"). 
61. The seventeenth-century political theorist Samuel Pufendorf referred to the "common 
Maxim of the Lawyers that Consenting and not Bedding, makes a Marriage." S. PUFENDORF, 
OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS, bk. 6, ch. 1, § 14, at 451 (2d ed. 1710) (1st ed. 1672) 
(emphasis in original), quoted in R. GOODIN, PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE: A REANALYSIS 
OF OUR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILmES 72 (1985). 
62. J. GILLIS, supra note 60, at 20. 
June 1986] Loyalty Oaths 1457 
before witnesses."63 The vows spoken in the sixteenth century are rec-
ognizably similar to those probably taken by the married readers of 
this essay. Thus John Brotherton in the 1560s pledged to Alice Ince, 
"Here I take the, Alice Ince, to my wief, before all other women, so 
God me helpe .... "64 By the seventeenth century, one reads of a 
blacksmith marrying his friends by commanding them to confirm their 
intention "to have and to hold for better for worse, till death us do 
part."65 
How do we conceptualize marriage? One answer is provided by 
David Hartman: 
Marriage is an invitation to enter a relationship that is close and intimate 
but that does not abolish the individuality of either partner. The com-
mitment to respond to the feelings and needs of the other is so strong 
that the other becomes a part of one's own self-definition, yet the same 
commitment implies that the other is recognized as an individual with a 
will distinct from one's own. 66 
Although each partner remains "autonomous, ... it is an autonomy in 
which the relational framework is fundamental to one's self-under-
standing." In comparing this to the covenantal relationship between 
persons and God, the central topic of his book A Living Covenant, 
Hartman points to "a similar fusion of relational self-understanding 
and autonomy. The love of the covenantal community for God is such 
that its members do not act with an isolated consciousness. Their self-
definition includes their relationship to God . . .. "67 
Hartman captures with great beauty the difference between a genu-
ine relationship - including a covenantal one - and a mere contrac-
tual agreement. The latter is presumably often the product merely of 
self-interested reasoning; each party collaborates only because of an 
individual decision that egoistic interests will be better served by 
agreeing than by rejecting an offer. There is no notion at all that "an 
isolated consciousness" is overcome merely because two parties agree 
to a joint endeavor. Hartman is working within a distinguished tradi-
tion; it was Hegel, after all, who defined as "shameful"68 a marriage 
that is "degraded to the level of a contract for reciprocal use."69 The 
63. Id. at 38. 
64. Id. at 44. 
65. Id. at 45. 
66. D. HARTMAN, A LIVING COVENANT: THE INNOVATIVE SPIRIT IN TRADITIONAL JU-
DAISM 5 {1985). 
67. Id. 
68. G. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, 1175 (1821), quoted in R. GOODIN, supra note 61, at 
91. 
69. G. HEGEL, supra note 68, at 1J 161 additions, quoted in R. GOODIN, supra note 61, at 91. 
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point, Hegel says, is to "transcend the standpoint of contract" as the 
marriage partners grasp their relationship in terms of "love, trust, and 
the common sharing of their entire existence."70 
The American view of contract is that there is precious little obli-
gation to adhere to the agreement if one of the parties comes to a deci-
sion that a breach would be, in the language of the trade, "efficient."71 
Someone who keeps a contract even where simply paying damages 
would have been cheaper is regarded with some perplexity, perhaps 
even ultimately labeled "irrational." The marriage relationship de-
fined by Hartman and Hegel is obviously something different. If the 
other truly becomes part of one's own self-definition, then the lan-
guage of egoistic individualism is no longer descriptively adequate. 72 
In harming the other (or not being concerned with achieving the good 
of the other), one is also in a significant sense harming oneself (or 
expressing insufficient concern about one's own well-being). 
Obviously the vows that announce (or are a performative utterance 
establishing) one's "marriage" announce as well an already trans-
formed consciousness, whereby one has accepted the potential of self-
redefinition in terms of this new two-person community. It would in-
deed be odd if this act were performed in "private" because almost by 
definition one is eager to affirm to the world this transformation of self. 
If one is willing to be married only in private, that would seem to 
suggest strongly, in the absence of some special circumstances, that 
one should hesitate to get married at all. 
An additional aspect of marriage vows is that they announce an 
unequivocal priority of commitment to the new spouse. 73 To "forsake 
all others" may or may not include sexual fidelity. However, it almost 
certainly must include the renunciation of overriding emotional loyal-
70. G. HEGEL, supra note 68, at ~ 163, quoted in R. GOODIN, supra note 61, at 91. 
71. A breaching party, to be sure, has a duty to pay damages, so that the victim of the breach 
gets the benefit of the bargain, but a presumption exists against requiring "specific performance." 
The most famous statement of this view is surely Holmes': "The duty to keep a contract at 
common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,-and nothing 
else." Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897) (emphasis added); see 
Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, 602 F. Supp. 1189, 1194 (D. Mass. 1985) (relying 
upon Holmes' bad man theory of contract law). However, my colleague Douglas Laycock has in 
conversation labeled a "myth" the classic notion articulated by Holmes. According to Laycock, 
"Courts frequently grant specific performance of contracts for the sale of ordinary goods if scar-
city, time constraints, or the sheer size of the contract make it difficult or impossible to cover." 
D. LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 368 (1985). See generally id. at 364-97; D. Lay-
cock, The Scattered Remnants of the Irreparable Injury Rule (manuscript in preparation). 
72. See, however, G. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1981), for a modern effort by a 
Chicago economist to explain marriage in exchange theory and contractual terms. 
73. The comments made about marriage do not depend on rejection of bigamy or other 
forms of polygamy. Presumably a bigamist has a different level of commitment to his wives than 
to others. 
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ties to any other person besides one's spouse, at least so long as com-
peting loyalties are not legitimated by being entirely descent-based, as 
would be the case, for example, with loyalties to one's parents or chil-
dren. What presumably cannot be tolerated is the prospect of multiple 
consent-based loyalties. 
In the case of both politics and marriage, the oaths are in obvious 
tension with social realities: emigration and expatriation are real op-
tions for many, and divorce rates testify to the reality of similar op-
tions for the married. Some have even suggested that latter-day 
wedding vows take these new realities into account, though no one, I 
think, has suggested a plausible set of oaths. Does one pledge, for 
example, to love, honor, and protect "so long as nobody better comes 
along," "so long as you fulfill my needs," or whatever?74 
Nor does one see the argument, often asserted with regard to polit-
ical loyalty oaths, that it is fruitless to ask for overt promises because 
of their manifest ineffectiveness - or worse. Thus, Donald Herzog has 
written, about political oaths, that they "generate not loyalty, but hy-
pocrisy, resentment, and even secret illegal behavior ... , even as 
pushing for religious conformity in early modern Europe multiplied 
religious opposition."75 Presumably, anyone who intends to be loyal 
will be so without a specific promise, and those who are in fact disloyal 
will further demonstrate their perfidy by cheerfully lying about it and 
making promises that they have no intention of carrying out. Yet why 
do we not accept similar arguments in regard to wedding vows, which 
almost undoubtedly generate measures of "hypocrisy, resentment, and 
even" the particular "secret illegal behavior" of adultery? Instead, we 
accept these consequences because of the presumably greater goods 
generated by the availability of the wedding ceremony and the public 
exchange of vows. 
Our ability to adopt ironic postures toward protestations of undy-
ing future love or commitment is a testament to our modernity. But 
our willingness to continue exchanging such vows - and to be moved 
at the wedding ceremonies we are privileged to attend - is a testa-
ment as well to our recognition of the possibility of a transformed (and 
socialized) consciousness. If that is the case with the dyadic commu-
nity that we call marriage, then why not with more embracing com-
munities that we call polities? 
74. I am informed by Prof. Ellen Kandoian of wedding ceremonies in Maine during the 
1970s that pledged durability of the marriage "as long as love shall last." Letter from Ellen 
Kandoian to Sanford Levinson (September 23, 1986). 
75. Letter from Donald Herzog to Sanford Levinson (June 5, 1986). 
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v. AN "INTIMATE" POLITY? 
In A Living Covenant, Hartman goes from the most personal of 
relationships, that with one's spouse, to the most cosmic of en-
counters, that with God. I am more interested in an intermediate rela-
tionship, that with one's fellow members of a polity. Can one imagine 
referring to one's fellow citizens in the same terms that Hartman 
evokes? Can we say, that is, that the invitation to enter a political 
community is (or ought to be) similar to beseeching a newcomer to 
forgo an "isolated consciousness" and replace it with "a relationship 
that is close and intimate"? Does one want to offer the polity as a 
candidate for a "relational framework . . . fundamental to one's self-
understanding"? Surely one of the powerful visions running through 
much contemporary social thought is that of political community. 
Yet inevitable tensions exist between the notion of liberal freedom, 
with its historic emphasis on individuated, if not indeed isolated, con-
sciousness, and the claims of community.76 
Even within liberalism itself, though, the question of loyalty oaths 
takes on a new dimension when one factors in the liberal emphasis on 
consent as the basis of political obligation. That notion, of course, has 
always proved theoretically recalcitrant. Active consent as an opera-
tive principle seems to doom the state to practical impotence; among 
other problems is that no one who had not given such consent would 
be obligated to obey the laws of the state. Those persons who manifest 
clear desire to join the political community accord it great legitimacy 
- after all, they made an affirmative decision to enter it, but the state 
is usually interested in imposing notions of obligation upon everyone, 
not only the active consenters. Thus is derived the Lockean solution of 
"tacit" consent, though this ultimately removes what is most attrac-
tive about active consent. Tacit consent maximizes the number of per-
sons obligated, but loses the strength of a legitimacy based on the 
(active) consent of the govemed.77 
One way of handling the problem of consent - and of remaining 
faithful to one of the best aspects of the liberal heritage - is through a 
loyalty oath. That presumably is at least one of the reasons behind the 
requirement that new citizens take such an oath. Native-born citizens, 
like myself, are presumably viewed as manifesting tacit consent, but no 
such assumptions are made about naturalized citizens, even if they 
have lived in the United States for many years as resident aliens. 
76. See M. SANDEL, supra note 14, at 59-65. 
77. There is a direct relationship between the numbers of persons obligated and the trivializa-
tion of what counts as "consent" of the governed. I am grateful to Jim Fishkin for emphasizing 
this point in conversations with me. 
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If we were willing to adopt a more explicitly Rousseauean vocabu-
lary, we could talk of the process whereby "men" (or "women") be-
come transformed into citizens. It is not at all coincidental that 
Rousseau is also associated with the notion of "civil religion," 
whereby the state inculcates its authority in part through adopting 
techniques borrowed from sectarian religion. 
The transformation from personhood into citizenship is, of course, 
not at all inevitable.78 Michael Walzer has suggested that most con-
temporary "citizens" of a country like the United States are more ac-
curately described as psychological resident aliens than genuinely 
active participants (the sine qua non of most theories of citizenship) in 
the society.79 One need not condemn this passivity, but social and 
political theory must take account of such realities. More particularly, 
one must ask if a country consisting primarily of resident aliens80 can 
sustain itself as a community with ideals worth professing. 
VI. CREEDAL ORTHODOXY AND RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES 
David Hartman's book is ostensibly about the relationship between 
God and human beings. However, this relationship is ultimately me-
diated through a Jewish community that in turn becomes part of the 
essential self-definition of the individual Jews. But the question of 
wedding vows is also implicated in Hartman's metaphor. As I under-
stand Hartman's theology, God indeed enters into the covenant with 
Jews and Judaism, first with Abraham and then much more impor-
tantly at Sinai. Although Hartman rejects any claims of Jewish exclu-
siveness in being God's elect (God presumably can be a bigamist), 
there is nonetheless a promise of some special relationship and of at 
1 least some degree of care and protection. 
Do Jews qua Jews make some kind of covenantal affirmation on 
their part in order to make the marriage "kosher," as it were? Is there 
a Judaic "Apostles' Creed" that defines what it means to be Jewish, so 
that refusal to affirm its tenets serves to indicate one's disaffiliation 
from the community? Historically, at least, that has not been a major 
aspect of Judaism, though the religious liturgy certainly contains as-
pects similar to propositional creeds.81 Many Jews do not in fact at-
78. See J. SHKLAR, MEN AND CmZENS: A STUDY OF ROUSSEAU'S SOCIAL THEORY 57 
(1969). 
79. M. WALZER, Political Alienation and Military Service, in OBLIGATIONS 99-100, 112-13 
(1970). 
80. Whose status is a function of their being "alienated residents." See id. at 114. 
81. Thus one modem prayerbook prefaces the "Sh'ma" - "Hear, 0 Israel: The Lord our 
God, the Lord is One" - with the comment, "We formally affirm God's sovereignty, freely 
pledging Him our loyalty." SIDDUR SIM SHALOM 284-85 (J. Harlow ed. 1985). And the song 
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tend services, in part because of an inability to affirm these creeds, yet 
they do not lose their identity as Jews. Membership in the community 
for most is biological, i.e., being born of a Jewish mother, and no one is 
asked to indicate his or her adherence to a list of theological proposi-
tions. In this sense, Judaism is an example of a "descent-based" com-
munity. 82 Conversion to Judaism raises a number of fascinating 
problems, though even there one finds relatively little emphasis on the 
propositional content of Judaism; far more important is the expressed 
willingness of the convert to take on the behavioral duties attached to 
Judaism. 
The reference above to the Apostles' Creed points to the creedal 
(and intentional) nature of what is numerically the principal religion 
within the W estem tradition. Membership in many branches of the 
Christian religious community requires public commitment to their 
particular creeds, the particular church's propositional "understand-
ing of the meaning of Scripture."83 As Professor Leith notes, "The 
creed has the negative role of shutting the heretic out and setting the 
boundaries within which authentic Christian theology and life can 
take place."84 
"Yigdal" that often concludes Sabbath religious services "is based upon thirteen principles of 
faith articulated by Maimonides.'' Id. at 327. 
82. See W. SOLLORS, supra note 10. 
83. CREEDS OF THE CHURCHES: A READER IN CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE FROM THE BIBLE TO 
THE PRESENT 8 (J. Leith 3d ed. 1982). The asking of such a commitment, and the intensity of 
feeling surrounding its affirmation, may vary, of course, not only among the particular denomi-
nations of Christianity, but also across the time embraced within the history of a given denomi· 
nation. See, for example, a recent description by Professor Lief Carter of the local Episcopal 
church that he attends and in which he "actively participate[s]": 
It has become crystal clear to me that no shared theological or ideological basis constitutes 
this community or permits smooth mediation of disputes .... My church community is 
constituted of and mediated by symbols, rituals, musical and rhetorical performances, dis-
plays of good character and, above all, affection expressed through conversation. Theology 
is rarely mentioned outside the service. When it comes up, it is as likely to start a fight as it 
is to mediate one. 
Carter, Jumping: Mashaw on Due Process in the Administrative State (Book Review), 1986 AM. 
B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 141, 148-49. What, then, does it mean to call oneself an "Episcopa· 
lian"? Is a "conversational community" the same as a "faith community"? See also note 109 
infra. 
84. CREEDS OF THE CHURCHES, supra note 83, at 9; see, e.g., Berger, Vatican Tells Priest to 
Retract View~ N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1986, at A17, col. 1, detailing a letter sent to Catholic 
University Professor Charles Curran from Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, prefect of the Sacred Con-
gregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. The Vatican took exception to Father Curran's views on 
the legitimacy of birth control and other sexually related activities, and he was requested to 
"reconsider and retract these positions which violate the conditions necessary for a professor to 
be called a Catholic theologian.'' Id. at col. 4. Cardinal Ratzinger, in an action approved by 
Pope John Paul II, subsequently revoked Father Curran's right to tench theology at Catholic 
University "in light of your repented refusal to accept what the church teaches." Goldman, 
Vatican Curbs U.S. Theologian Over Liberal Views on Sex Issues, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1986, at 
1, col. 2. The Chancellor of the University, Archbishop James Hickey, stated that he 
fully support[ed] this judgment of the Holy See .... The Holy Father and the bishops have 
the right and the duty to insure that what is taught in the name of the church be completely 
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There are obvious political analogies to creedal affirmations. Thus 
naturalized Americans, at least, cannot be radical "protestants" in de-
fining what "Americanism" means to them, as can presumably those 
of us who are native-born "Americans." We are free to regard the 
Constitution as an abomination and even support its violent replace-
ment by a more agreeable substitute; naturalized citizens, however, are 
formally bound to swear that their new self-definition of being "Amer-
ican" will include at least the propositions laid out in their oath - and 
these propositions refer not simply to something that might be called 
generalized "national" loyalty, but also to the specific creedal affirma-
tions laid out in the Constitution. 85 
VII. THE SPECTRE OF MULTIPLE COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIPS 
Thus far this essay has examined three notions of self-definition, 
and of actual and potential oaths announcing those definitions. I want 
to conclude by focusing upon perhaps the most important problem 
generated by the idea ofloyalty oaths - the requirement of exclusivity 
of attachment, whether to one country, one spouse, or one God. 86 All 
of these oaths are attempts to fend off the feared development of dual 
loyalty, which, like imperium in imperio in eighteenth-century 
thought, is seen as close to a logical absurdity. 
Dual loyalty as an issue obviously cuts straight to the ~eart of both 
theory and practice. Consider Michael Walzer's comment that "a plu-
ralist, at bottom, is a man with more than one commitment, who may 
at any moment have to choose among his different obligations. "87 
However much we may choose pluralism as the preferred path for 
ourselves, there is inevitably something disquieting about recognizing 
the same pluralistic openness in our fellows, for it may be their pre-
sumed obligations to ourselves that they may choose to reject. Thus 
one can perceive loyalty oaths as a hedge against Walzerian contin-
gency. Institutions and individuals, whether the state, one's spouse, or 
God, are, in sociologist Lewis Coser's term, "greedy,"88 always seek-
ing ways of making themselves the true centers of attention. Ideally, 
faithful to its full and authentic teaching. The faithful have a right to sound teaching and 
the church's officially commissioned teachers have a particular responsibility to honor that 
right. 
Id. at 14, col. 2. 
85. Once within the polity, though, naturalized citizens presumably acquire the same free-
dom of belief that we have and may repudiate the propositional oaths earlier taken. 
86. See generally M. GRODZINS, THE LoYAL AND THE DISLOYAL: SOCIAL BOUNDARIES OF 
PATRIOTISM AND TREASON 5-8 (1956). 
87. M. WALZER, The Problem of Citizenship, in OBLIGATIONS 205 (1970). 
88. L. COSER, GREEDY INSTITUTIONS: PATTERNS OF UNDIVIDED COMMITMENT (1974). 
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from their perspectives, the kind of pluralism described - indeed cele-
brated - by Walzer becomes impossible. Few devotees of pluralism in 
the abstract are genuinely willing to embrace the divided loyalty of a 
spouse, for example, and those who take the nation-state with the ut-
most seriousness often prove just as uncomprehending of the legiti-
macy of multiple attachments. 
Recall that in the basic American oath the new citizen is asked to 
"renounce and abjure absolutely and entirely all allegiance and fidelity 
to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty of whom or 
which the petitioner was before a subject or citizen." We demand that 
naturalized citizens give priority to the new polity, although the no-
tion of hyphenated citizenship recognizes the continuation of at least 
sentimental ties to the old culture as well. Such "abjuration" oaths are 
not universal, however. James Kettner, in his magisterial study of the-
ories of American citizenship, writes of state naturalization policy fol-
lowing the Revolution that, although "[a]pplicants for citizenship 
were expected to swear or affirm publicly their allegiance to the new 
states," only "[o]ccasionally [were] they required to disavow explicitly 
all foreign attachments."89 The Constitution, of course, made naturali-
zation a matter of national, rather than state, concem.90 
The Naturalization Act of 1790, the first passed by Congress, re-
quired an affirmative oath of allegiance but did not require renuncia-
tion of previous commitments.91 That arrived only in 1795, with the 
passage of a more comprehensive naturalization act. Some of the pres-
sures for revision were a result of the dislocations in Europe touched 
off by the French Revolution and the consequent warfare on the conti-
nent. The United States, committed to splendid neutrality three thou-
sand miles away, proved attractive to "discontented Englishmen, 
aristocratic Frenchmen, German pietists fleeing forced military ser-
vice, French planters escaping from West Indian uprisings led by 
Toussaint l'Ouverture, and Irishmen in flight from British repres-
sion."92 This in-migration of a "large number of refugees with pas-
sionate political beliefs"93 led to heightened concern about the 
prerequisites for becoming a member of the American community. 
The amended act required not only explicit abjuration, but also renun-
89. J. KETINER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870, at 218 
(1978). 
90. See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8: "The Congress shall have Power ..• to establish a uniform 
Rule of Naturalization .•. throughout the United States." 
91. Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103. 
92. J.M. SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETIERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN 
CIVIL LIBERTIES 23 (1956). 
93. J. KETINER, supra note 89, at 240. 
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ciation of any title of nobility borne by the newcomer.94 Both the ab-
juration and the renunciation have been a part of American law ever 
since.95 
Yet to this day not all countries require abjuration of their new 
citizens. The most important example in the contemporary world is 
almost certainly Israel. The ability to become an Israeli citizen with-
out renouncing prior loyalties is precisely what allows retention of 
United States citizenship (and passports), as loss of that citizenship 
requires explicit renunciation rather than the mere act of becoming a 
citizen of another country. To this extent, then, American law toler-
ates political bigamy so long as the second political marriage follows, 
rather than precedes, the acquiring of United States citizenship. 
One does not have to be religious in order to be skeptical of the 
workability of bigamy, at least among equals. Similar doubts can arise 
concerning the implications of dual nationality. If conflicts arise, it is 
hard to believe that the United States does not expect a resolution in 
favor of itself where basic issues of loyalty are concerned. Consider, 
for example, the fate of Tomoya Kawakita, a dual national of both 
Japan and the United States who had lived in Japan during World 
War II and engaged in serious mistreatment of American prisoners of 
war. He was prosecuted and convicted of treason, a crime that can be 
committed only by a citizen; indeed, he received a death sentence. The 
Supreme Court, through Justice Douglas, upheld the conviction.96 
Kawakita had been born in the United States in 1921; he therefore 
had birthright citizenship. He went to Japan in 1939, traveling on a 
U.S. passport: "to obtain it he took the customary oath of alle-
giance."97 Staying in Japan, Kawakita, after registering 1with the 
American consulate as an American citizen, entered Meiji University. 
"In April, 1941, he renewed his United States passport, once more 
taking the oath of allegiance to the United States."98 Remaining in 
Japan throughout World War II, he accepted employment as an inter-
preter with a Japanese corporation that used American prisoners of 
war as factory workers. It was his conduct toward these workers that 
constituted the treasonable acts for which he was convicted. 
Kawakita returned to the United States, on an American passport, 
in 1946. "He stated under oath that he was a United States citizen 
94. Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 414. 
95. See Immigration and Nationality Act§ 337(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1448(b) (1982) (renunciation). 
96. Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952). 
97. 343 U.S. at 720. 
98. 343 U.S. at 720. 
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and had not done various acts amounting to expatriation."99 Only 
after his return, when he was recognized by a former prisoner of war, 
was he arrested, tried, and ultimately convicted. His lawyers argued 
at trial that he had renounced his American citizenship and thus had 
no duty of allegiance to the United States. 
The courts found no evidence that Kawakita had actively re-
nounced his citizenship. The Supreme Court did refer to "an adminis-
trative ruling of the State Department that a person with a dual 
citizenship who lives abroad in the other country claiming him as a 
national owes an allegiance to it which is paramount to the allegiance 
he owes the United States."100 This recognition of "paramount" sta-
tus did not, however, prevent the Court from upholding the conviction 
- and the death sentence. It pointed out that Kawakita could have 
taken himself out of the reach of the treason laws by renouncing his 
citizenship in the United States. But having retained his citizenship, 
he also retained at least "a minimum of allegiance which he owes to 
the United States while he resides in the enemy country. . . . An 
American citizen owes allegiance to the United States wherever he 
may reside."101 
I presume that Israeli citizens, however much they may hold on to 
United States, Canadian, or other passports, are in fact expected un-
equivocally to prefer the interests of Israel over those of the other 
country. A truly complete dual citizenship, which would have to 
mean equally genuine dual loyalty (or else what do we mean by "citi-
zenship"?), 102 is no more an operative part of American ideology than 
is social (or legal) tolerance of bigamy. Yet current constitutional doc-
trine requires legal tolerance of dual citizenship, 103 even if not, at least 
not yet, of bigamous marriage. 104 
But an equal promise of priority is included in the wedding vow. 
Not surprisingly, this conflict between the public and the private, the 
99. 343 U.S. at 721. 
100. 343 U.S. at 734-35. 
101. 343 U.S. at 735-36. 
102. Douglas Laycock, for example, notes that citizenship "is the definitive indication of the 
polity with which one is affiliated." Laycock, Taking Constitutions Seriously: A Theory of Judi-
cial Review, 59 TEXAS L. REV. 343, 388 (1981) (emphasis added). He seems to assume that the 
proper article is "the" rather than "a," though dual citizenship requires the use of the latter. 
103. See Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 329 (1939); T.A. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra 
note 49, at 917-33. 
104. For what it is worth, I doubt that there is a plausible nonreligious rationale for the 
state's prohibition of bigamy and most other atypical forms of marriage. In the absence of legiti-
mate secular reasons, I would have little trouble interpreting the Constitution to protect such 
marriages against state regulation. I would, however, scarcely predict this as a likely develop-
ment in the near future, especially given the Supreme Court's egregious decision in Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986). 
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family and the state, itself generates exquisite problems in the law. 
For example, most states grant testimonial privileges against the 
forced (or perhaps even voluntary) testimony by one spouse against 
another, and all states protect confidential statements from even vol-
untary disclosure before a court. 105 
A classic tension in republican political theory, in fact, is that be-
tween the claims of chaste public life and the more sensual private 
realm. This is revealed by a telling piece of Americana, the debate at 
the time of the Revolutionary War over the official seal for the new 
country. John Adams suggested that the seal show Hercules, staring 
resolutely ahead at a mountain labeled "virtue," being enticed by a 
half-clothed woman labeled "sloth."106 Political revolutionaries have 
always been suspicious of the sensual (and oft-times even of the fam-
ily), precisely insofar as accepting its legitimacy allows the direction of 
energies (and loyalties) away from the life of the polity. 
But religion itself also makes obvious claims of sovereignty as 
against other social institutions.107 A staple of political theory follow-
ing the development of the notion of political sovereignty by Bodin is 
that there cannot be two sovereigns within a polity. By definition sov-
ereignty is an exclusive status. Yet anyone who takes (at least West-
ern) religion seriously poses an alternative sovereign against the claims 
of the State, however much the claims are dissipated by doctrines like 
the Talmudic injunction to follow the local law or by Christian doc-
trines about God and Caesar. 
The United States has its Jehovah's Witnesses and Amish-both 
radical Protestant sectarians - who render unto Caesar the most min-
imal of recognition. Israel, of course, includes a contingent of Jews 
105. See Levinson, Testimonial Privileges and the Preferences of Friendship, 1984 DUKE L.J. 
631. 
106. What was selected, of course, was the mystic pyramid and eye, with the slogan, "A New 
Order for a New World." See, e.g., United States, One Dollar Federal Reserve Note, serial no. 
F92945666C (1985), reverse side (on file in author's wallet). 
107. See, e.g., Seib, Religious Discord Rises Among Israeli Jews, Spurs Intense Debate, Wall 
St. J., June 18, 1986, at l, col. l, which details the increasing conflict between "religious" and 
secular Jews in Israel, including a number of attacks by the so-called ultra-Orthodox on bus stops 
containing offensive advertisements. Seib writes that the 
ultra-Orthodox seem to consider arrest and sentencing for such activities more a cause for 
celebration than consternation. On one recent morning, when religious Jews were being 
sentenced for bus-stop attacks, two handcuffed young ultra-Orthodox men burst into a 
happy song as they were led into a municipal court [in Jerusalem]. "God is our king, and 
only to him [sic] are we slaves," they sang as friends joined in. 
Id. at 12, col. 1. See also the comment by Professor Paul Simmons of the Southern Baptist 
Theological Seminary: "[I]dentifying the Judeo-Christian posture with American nationalism is 
to lose the transcendent and absolute nature of the Christian faith. For Christians and Jews, 
loyalty to God must transcend any earthly loyalties." Quoted in Lasch, What's Wrong with the 
Right, T!KKUN, Number I, 1986, at 23, 28. 
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who reject the legitimacy of the state because they interpret the tradi-
tional Jewish sources to forclose the legitimacy of a "Jewish state" 
that is not Messianically founded. And, from the other end of the 
spectrum, a significant threat to Israel's integrity is posed by militant 
religious Zionists who interpret Jewish law to prohibit any voluntary 
renunciation of Eretz Israel, are seemingly threatening disobedience 
(and potential civil war) should an Israeli government agree to any 
such renunciation, as by an agreement with Jordan. 
All political states, then, face the problem of multiple loyalties of 
their citizenry; this is the price of a pluralist culture. Some of the time 
the competing loyalty is to other political entities; on other occasions, 
though, the competitors are other institutions within the society, 
whether family or religious community. Generally speaking, we do 
not treat these competitors equally. Thus we find understandable -
and endorse - the demand made by the United States that its new 
citizens repudiate their previous primary loyalties to other countries. 
Yet I am quite sure that most of us would condemn as totalitarian an 
explicit requirement by the United States (or any other country) that 
one affirm primary loyalty to it over the competing loyalties to family 
f and religion. I believe that there is a greater problem here than the 
l traditional learning allows. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Over 2500 years ago the prophet Amos asked, "Will two walk to-
gether, Except they have agreed?"108 The particular context of his 
writing suggests that the "two" being discussed are God and the peo-
ple of Israel. But the question haunts even a secular consciousness 
concerned with constructing social orders among human beings. To 
what extent can strangers walk together in everyday life unless they 
can count on one another to have agreed on a minimal common way 
of life or common morality, to have entered into what might 
portentously be called a common covenant based on those understand-
ings? It is, after all, such understandings, whether or not predicated 
on myths of social contract or covenant, that help to define that elu-
sive thing called "community."to9 
108. Amos 3:3 (THE TwELVE PROPHETS 93-94 (A. Cohen trans. 1948)). 
109. Cf. L. CARTER, CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL LAWMAKING: THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE ART OF PoLmcs 15 (1985) (emphasis in original): 
Communities are those networks of people who believe their past communications had 
meaning and who have faith that future communications will also have meaning. Commu-
nity members do not necessarily share substantive beliefs. Good friends who disagree 
strongly about ideologies, scientific propositions, and questions of taste remain good friends 
as long as they continue to use the same communicative framework. 
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Concerns about loyalty can arise only in a pluralistic world of mul-
tiple c.ommunities. The handling of conflicts engendered by pluralism 
of communal attachment, especially when those communities are "in-
tentional" in form, raises profound problems in both theory and prac-
tice, especially for those societies, like the United States, that classify 
themselves as "liberal." An essential question of our internal politics 
is what, if anything, constitutes the "common ground" of our social 
and political life. Is it sufficiently solid to allow us to walk together, or 
is it so divided by rifts and threatened by sinkholes as to make any 
journey precarious? 
Robert Booth Fowler, reviewing Anthony Lukas' prize-winning 
study of three Boston families, Common Ground, iio notes the 
profound paradox contained within the title. The ultimate commonal-
ity seems to be only uneasily (indeed, angrily and sometimes violently) 
shared territorial space; otherwise, according to Fowler, Lukas "re-
flects modem liberalism's fundamental skepticism about basic answers 
in life." The lack of a common ground of "basic philosophical or reli-
gious answers," however, is viewed as "a positive thing, a basis for the 
virtue of social pluralism and intellectual diversity."111 What, Fowler 
then asks, "is the 'common ground' this book is [ostensibly] about?" 
Beyond Lukas' own profoundly liberal ability to delineate with respect 
the radically discordant worlds of his subjects, "Common Ground 
finds and can offer us no common ground. It reflects modem liber-
alism at bay."112 
No one can seriously doubt that genuinely stable common grounds 
are constructed out of years of everyday practices, just as a "marriage" 
is ultimately achieved in the relationship between the spouses. Yet, 
just as the achievement of marriage usually includes a constitutive 
oath, so do political entities recurrently tum to the loyalty oath as a 
means of achieving community by creating ties and bonds capable of 
withstanding the temptations posed by competitors. 
I have tried to suggest, at the very least, that it may be much 
harder than we have recognized to develop a genuinely coherent ap-
proach to loyalty oaths once we move beyond "local" controversies 
posed by particular oaths in particular times. ·It may be, of course, 
However, Carter also writes that "[e]ven in normal times the conversations that build communi-
ties need authoritative and hence undisputed starting points." Id. at 51-52. 
110. J.A. LUKAS, COMMON GROUND: A TuRBULENT DECADE IN THE LIVES OF THREE 
AMERICAN FAMILIES (1985). 
111. Fowler, Book Review, 73 J. AM. HIST. 252, 252 (1986). 
112. Id. at 252-53; see A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1981), for an extended discussion 
( around the theme that "[t]he notion of the political community as a common project is alien to 
"- the modern individualist world." Id. at 146. 
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that only such particularities are worth discussing, but that conclusion 
in itself would have significant implications for the way that we ap-
proach moral and political issues, including those generated by the 
notion of community. In the meantime, we are still left with the task 
of resolving our own views about the oaths we take - and require of 
others - when we adopt new citizenship, get a passport, get married, 
or join in religious fellowship. 
